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Introduction 
W e have seen extraordinary changes in the role of the mili tary within do-mestic American society since September 11, 2001. The National De-
fense Authorization Act of 2003 created the office that I now hold. The statutory 
mission assigned to the assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense was-
and is-to supclVise all of the homeland defense activities of the Department of 
Defense. In short, to supervise the domestic role of the US military, to include both 
the warfightingdefense of the United States and the consequence management ac-
tivities of the Department of Defense when providing support to civilian authori-
ties. That is a sobering mission. It reflects the intent of Congress to bring a special 
geographic focus to the department that reflects the paramount security consider-
ations associated with the immediate defense of the American people. It is a mis-
sion that sobers me every morning. 
Constitutional Principles 
When I was asked to take this position I thought seriously about the role of the mil-
itary within domestic society, the historic and statutory constraints upon that role 
and the appropriate opportunity within the boundaries of those constraints for the 
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US armed forces to make a contribution to the physical security of the American 
people. It required me to re-examine some first principles of constitutional gov-
ernment and the effective protection of civilian democratic principles so deeply 
embedded in our US Constitution. 
With that as motivation, I returned to the Federalist papers. I selVed three terms 
in the House of Representatives in the 1990s. When I left the House, I decided to 
read the Federalist papers in their entirety. Like many political science majors, I 
had read portions-Federalist 10 and Federalist 51-but I had never read all 
eighty-five from beginning to end. 
I think most of you participating in this conference are familiar to at least some 
degree with the Federalist papers. For those of you in the international community 
who may not be familiar with them, just let me briefly set the stage. Over the sum-
mer of 1787 the Constitution of the United States was written in the city of Phil a-
delphia. The framers of the Constitution finished their work in September 1787. 
Then the question became whether or not the required nine of the original thirteen 
states would ratify the framers' work. As in any political context there was serious 
debate, on this occasion between the federalists and the anti-federalists. That de-
bate was carried on in the newspapers of the day. Between the time of the comple-
tion of the draft and the ul timate ratification of the Constitution, Alexander 
Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay-principally Hamilton and Madison-
wrote eighty-five op-ed pieces. Those commentaries were ultimately bound to-
gether into the published work that we know today as Tile Federalist. I 
There are legal scholars who believe that The Federalist may be the finest work 
oflegal li terature ever written in the English language. A few years ago Professor 
Bernard Schwartz, Chapman Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of 
Tulsa, came up with his list of the top ten legal books ever written in the English 
language; at the top of the list was The Federa/ist. 2 I'm not sure that I would go that 
far , but I knew when I retired from Congress I wanted to read the Federalist papers. 
I knew that the only way in which I would have the discipline to do so would be if I 
volunteered to teach a course on the Federalist papers at one of the colleges in my 
hometown. So I returned to Pennsylvania and taught a course on the Federalist pa-
pers for a year or so staying about three papers ahead of the students and develop-
ing my expertise in explaining their meaning. 
Federalist Paper No.8 talks with specificity about the role of the military within 
the borders of our nation; it is a cautionary message. When I first read Alexander 
Hamilton's words I thought they were an anachronism. He was concerned that the 
role of the mili tary would become too intrusive within domestic American society. 
He feared that if that role were to be too powerful the character of our nation and 
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the core principles of the Constitution would be adversely affected. Those fears 
were expressed in the fo llowing words (to which 1 have added my own thoughts): 
Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the 
ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent destruction 
of life and property incident to war [think September 11 J, the continual effort and 
alarm attendant on a state of continual danger [think al-QaedaJ, will compel nations 
the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions which have 
a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe, they at length 
become willing to run the risk of being less free.3 
Later in Federalist 8 he talks very specifically about the US military in a manner 
that, I think, was prescient. When I studied government in college and first looked 
at the Federalist papers and firs t considered the role of the mili tary, I knew there 
was concern among our fo unders related to a large standing army. The implication 
was that a large standing army would by brute force impose military values upon a 
civilian government and a republican Consti tution. The fo rce of arms would be 
seen as the danger. 
That is not the rationale of Federalist 8-it's much more sophisticated, much 
more nuanced. It is not about brute force; it is about the choice to sacrifice liberty 
in order to achieve security. Hamilton wrote about nations that are internally se-
cure from external attack, as opposed to nations which remain internally subject to 
foreign attack; again thinkal-Qaeda. The twenty- fi rst-century reality, at least from 
our perspective within the Department of Defense, is that the United States is now 
an inherent, integrated element of a global battlespace from the vantage point of 
transnational terrorists.4 Indeed, I think it could be argued successfully that, from 
the terrorist standpoint, we are the pre-eminent element of that bat tles pace. Their 
intent is not to achieve victory through a war of attrition but to bring brutality into 
the internal confines of the United States. By bringing death and destruction to our 
citizens, they believe they can affect our political will. Well short of success in terms 
of attrition, they believe they can shape our political conscious by acts of brutality 
and if they can succeed in engaging in such acts within the United States they will 
have achieved pre-eminent success. 
Alexander Hamilton wrote of nations that must fear that kind of internal attack 
versus those that are relatively secure within a domestic setting. Let me take those 
in reverse order the way Hamilton did. He wrote, "[ t Jhere is a wide difference .. . 
between military establishments in a country seldom exposed by its situation to in-
ternal invasions . .. . "5 A recent example of such a country would be the United 
States during the Cold War when there was little danger of attack upon our terri-
tory. In this, the first case, the civil state remains in full vigor: 
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The smallness of the army renders the natural strength of the community an 
overmatch for it; and the citizens. not habituated to look up to the military power fo r 
protection, or to submit to its oppressions, neither love nor fear the soldiery; they view 
them with a spirit of jealous acquiescence in a necessary evil ... f' 
Hamilton then goes on to address, by contrast, the state of a nation that is "o ften 
subject to them [internal invasionsl. and always apprehensive of them."1 Since 
September 11. 2001 we in the United States. on a daily basis. remain uncertain as a 
matter of harsh reality as to when and under what circumstances our transnational 
terrorist adversaries might again strike us internally. Three thousand people Were 
killed on our own soil on September 11 th. Another attack could conceivably occur 
tomorrow so we remain subject to that continuing threat. Describing a nation in 
that circumstance. Hamilton wrote (again with the insertion of my thoughts): 
in a country, in the predicament last described, the contrary of all this happens. The 
perpetual menacings of danger [al-QaedaJ oblige the government to be always 
prepared to repel it. . The continual necessity for their services enhances the 
importance of the soldier, and proportionably degrades the condition of the citizen. 
The military state becomes elevated above the civil. The inhabitants .. . are unavoidably 
subjected to frequent infringements on their rights, which serve to weaken their sense 
of those rights; and by degrees, the people are brought to consider the soldiery not only 
as their protectors, but as their superiors. The transition from this disposition to that of 
considering them as masters, is neither remote, nor difficult. But it is very difficult to 
prevail upon a people under such impressions, to make a bold, or effectual resistance, 
to usurpations, supported by the military power.s 
Hamilton's concern was that if we allowed ourselves to get to the point where we 
were disproportionately dependent upon the military for internal security then we 
in the military would becom e the saviors o f society and citizens would no longer 
trust civilian government to provide for their physical securi ty. The citizenry 
would conclude. perhaps correctly. that only the m ilitary could p rovide for its in-
ternal security. Once that recognition occurred. the m ili tary would be seen as the 
masters and, ul timately. the leaders and superiors of society. In short, not brute 
force but rather the volun tary relinq uishment of the civilian character o f our gov-
ernment would raise the role of the mili tary disproportionately and ult imately 
threaten the civilian character of our Constitution. It would not be by force but by 
choice that the character of our nation would change because of the core mistake of 
allowing a disproportionate dependence upon military power for in ternal security. 
rather than a core dependence upon civilian law enforcem ent and civilian capabili-
ties to guarantee that same security. 
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Striking the Balance 
Those were sobering thoughts fo r me when I was nominated for the position in 
which I now serve and those have remained sobering thoughts guiding me and 
many others with whom I work. On a daily basis we consider the roles of the mili-
tary and civilian government and civilian capabilities when achieving securi ty 
within our own borders. Obviously when we begin to address national security is-
sues in terms of power projection and the ability to take the fight to the enemy 
overseas, the role of the military historically has been dominant. In my judgment 
that is correct. When we seek out terrorists and their supporters in places like Af-
ghanistan and Iraq, men and women in military uniform are at the vanguard of our 
nation's effort to achieve physical security. We send men and women in the armed 
forces forward in a lead role to engage the enemy and defeat such enemy attacks. 
But within our own country, it remains an issue of constant, sobering judgment to 
remain loyal and committed to the preservation of the civilian character of our 
government and the democratic nature of our Constitution, and, within that bal-
ance, properly employ the military in a manner that will enhance our security, 
while ensuring it remains ultimately subordinate to dear and decisive civilian au-
thority, which in tum will ensure the civilian character of our government. That is 
the nature of the challenge. There are many things we can do with military power 
within our own borders in order to achieve the security of the American people 
while not endangering the civilian character of o ur Constitution. But that is a 
continuing issue of sober assessment. We ought not blindly commit military 
fo rces to missions that should remain inherently civilian in character. If we use 
the military within our own borders fo r every mission that the military in theory 
could achieve, we will, in fact, tip the balance towards security and pay a price in 
terms of liberty. 
Thus, the question becomes how do you strike that balance? The remainder of 
my remarks will touch upon certain specific areas of operational activity where 
there are significant legal implications. But as I go through these challenges, both 
operational and legal, in each and every case I urge you to consider them in the 
continuing context of that balance between security and liberty and between the 
role of the military and the role of civilian government within the boundaries of 
domestic American society. Underlying the determination of that balance is the 
overarching requirement that those roles be consistent with the civilian core prin-
ciples of the US Constitution. 
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Homeland Security 
It became operationally clear-indeed it was instinctively obvious- that in light of 
the attack we had experienced on September 11th there was a need for enhanced 
physical security within the borders of our nation; the enemy had struck and might 
do so again. The Department of Defense, acting with operational prudence, created 
rapid reaction forces that could act within our own country. US Army and Marine 
Corps forces, in a classified number, were placed on alert for potential domestic de-
ployment of military force in order to defeat a follow-on al-Qaeda attack. It was 
clear that having struck us once the enemy might strike us again and that there was 
a role for military power in defeating such a fore ign attack on our soil. 
When I was confirmed as assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense 
and began to exercise the responsibilities and authority of supervising the home-
land defense activities of the Department of Defense, I determined that having 
rapid reaction Army and Marine Corps ground forces on alert fo r domestic de-
ployment was a reasonable course of action. But as a lawyer I asked myself, "Is that 
constitutional?" Is the ground deployment of US Army forces consistent with the 
Posse Comitatus Act of 1878?9 How do we deploy soldiers on our own soil in a 
manner consistent with the Constitution when to do so may potentially conflict 
with the posse comitatus statute?1O How do we reconcile the need to defend against 
another potential al-Qaeda attack with the Constitution and the law? 
I know there are individuals in the audience today from a nation-State that is 
today an extremely close friend and ally of the United States. But in 18 12 that nation-
State-I am not going to say which one----deployed ground forces to the United 
States. Those ground forces left, shall we say, a lasting impact upon the Capitol 
of our nation. While those forces were en route to the capital, US Marines were 
employed at Bladensburg, Maryland to defend against that attack. We were not 
quite as successful as we hoped we would be, but we utilized US military forces to 
defend our own soil under the same Constitution with which we live today 
against a foreign attack in order to save American lives and defend American 
property. 
The Constitution has not fundamentally changed in that regard. Article 2 of the 
Consti tution provides "The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and 
Navy of the United States .... "11 That executive power remains essentially the same 
today as it was 1814 when the defense of the capital occurred. As I thought it through, 
I turned to the US Army's Domestic Operatiotlal Law Hatldbook where I read about 
the Military Purpose Doctrine.ll The Military Purpose Doctrine states that the Posse 
Comitatus Act does not apply to those missions which arc being executed primar-
ily for a military purpose. The use of force fo r purposes other than arrest, search 
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and seizure is not proscribed by posse comitatus. When those Marines were de-
ployed in Bladensburg in 1814 they weren't there to arrest anybody and when we 
established quick reaction forces in the wake of September I I th the purpose was 
not law enforcement but warfighting on our own soil as it had taken place d uring 
the War of 1812 and, some would argue, as lincoln exercised that power during the 
Civil War. It was not that the power was not there; it was that we had not used it on 
our own soil for a military purpose in quite a long time. But I personally concluded 
that the Military Purpose Doctrine allows us to have Army units on alert-and we 
continue to have them on alert-prepared for ground deployment within the 
United States to defend, for instance, critical infrastructure, perhaps a nuclear 
power plant, against a transnational terrorist threat. 
We do not anticipate, however, that the first several layers of our defense against 
a foreign attack on our own soil would be military in character. We emphasize that 
the primary dependence is upon civilian law enforcement. But if federal, state and 
local law enforcement authorities and ultimately the National Guard cannot physi-
cally defend American citizens against a foreign threat on our soil, under the Mili-
tary Purpose Doctrine and consistent with the Posse Comitatus Act, we do have 
quick reaction forces ready to be deployed, not for purposes oflaw enforcement, 
but for purposes of warfighting under Article 2 of the Constitution in defense of 
the American people. 
Responding to Natural Disasters 
Having considered and addressed the use of military forces for defensive purposes, 
we then encountered the issue of the utilization of US military capabilities within 
US borders in the event of a natural disaster. Hurricane Katrina emphasized the 
challenges associated not with warfighting but the statutoI)' authority related to in-
cident management. Arguably the worst natural disaster in American histol)' took 
place on August 29, 2005 when Hurricane Katrina came ashore along the Gulf 
Coast. Nearly two thousand lives were lost; the damage is measured in the billions 
of dollars. The performance of the US military in response to what were truly hor-
rific circumstances was by most accounts superbly competent. That is not to say 
that the response to catastrophic events cannot be improved upon, b ut the simple 
fact is that the military response to Hurricane Katrina was arguably the largest, fast-
est deployment of mili tary capabilities in US history. Between August 29 and Sep-
tember 10, the United States deployed seventy-two thousand milital)' personnel-
fifty thousand National Guardsmen, twenty-two thousand active duty-to the 
Gulf Coast to provide humanitarian relief. Out of that military response came, I 
believe, a significant respect for milital)' capabilities, while simultaneously fa irly 
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harsh criticism was being directed, often with justification, towards some civilian 
response authori ties. 
The discussion began immediately thereafter as to the appropriate role of the 
military in response to a catastrophic natural event. The Stafford Act 13 and the 
Economy Act,14 as well as other provisions of statutory law, provide the Depart-
ment of Defense authority to assist a lead civilian agency in responding to a natural 
disaster or a man -made event. The issue then becomes: if the military does well in 
such circumstances, why not put the military in charge? That, again, raises some of 
the issues that were first raised in Federalist 8. President Bush sparked serious and 
thoughtful discussion on that issue in a way that I think he consciously intended. 
We were able to think through both the opportunities and the challenges associ-
ated with the use of military capabilities in providing such a response. There was 
discussion in the media and at senior levels of government with regard to the possi-
bility of designating the Department of Defense as the lead federal agency replac-
ing, at least on a temporary basis, the Department of Homeland Security in 
providing a federal response to a disaster. Then the lawyers got into the act. 
I have learned something from the Department of Justice with regard to the 
scope of the executive power under Article 2 of the Constitution and frankly it sur-
prised me; it might not have surprised Hamilton and Madison but it surprised me. 
The Department of Justice in a series of opinions, the most fundamental of which 
goes back to 2002, concluded that when the Congress of the United States assigns a 
certain responsibility by statute to a particular cabinet-level department, the presi-
dent lacks the authority thereafter to re-delegate that responsibility from the desig-
nated agency to another. That theory oflaw came into play in preliminary analyses 
of the issue of whether or not the authorities assigned to the Department of Home-
land Security under the Homeland Security Act of2002 15 could be re-delegated by 
the president to the Department of Defense. Some very thoughtful legal scholars, 
including some within the Department of Justice, concluded that the president 
could not do that. 
The Department of Homeland Security has been uniquely and specifically as-
signed the responsibility as the lead federal agency in responding to catastrophic 
events and in consequence management related to disasters. Whether or not it 
makes operational sense to reassign that responsibility, because Congress had spo-
ken on the issue, in the absence of follow-on congressional reconsideration of the 
Homeland Security Act of2002, it would appear, at least fo r the time being, that by 
law the lead federal agency in responding to natural disasters must remain the De-
partment of Homeland Security. 
As lawyers I ask you to consider what a profound impact the law and your pro-
fession had on a significant public policy debate. The outcome of that debate, at 
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least in the first phase, was conclusively determined by legal analysis. That doesn't 
dose the door on a more robust military role, but it means that that military role 
will remain, at least under current law, subordinate to a lead federal agency which 
is civilian in character. Whether or not one would agree with him, 1 suspect Alex-
ander Hamilton would feel pretty good about that result. 
The position of the Office of General Counsel of the Department of Defense is 
that we do not need to amend the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 . The Defense De-
partment has concluded the act does not impede in any significant way the military 
missions that the Department of Defense has been assigned to execute nor does the 
act present an unreasonable impediment to foreseeable military missions within 
the United States. Senator Warner and others have, from time to time, said as a 
matter of due diligence and prudence that a statute drafted in the Reconstruction 
era perhaps ought to be re-examined for its continued utility in the vastly different 
context of transnational terrorism of the twenty-first century. 
I believe without question the terminology of the Posse Comitatus Act is out of 
date. We found ourselves, for instance, in the aftermath of Katrina dealing with 
civil disorder on the streets of New Orleans. lfwe were to experience a terrorist at-
tack involving a weapon of mass destruction, it is entirely possible that the social 
chaos inevitably associated with such a catastrophic event would generate substan-
tial civil disorder. In those circumstances, it might well be that the principles ofthe 
Posse Comitatus Act would come into play in terms of the use of Title 10 active-
duty military personnel in providing immediate protection of constitutional rights 
and enforcement of federa l statutes in circumstances where, for a limited period of 
time, civilian law enforcement authorities fo und themselves incapable of guaran-
teeing those constitutional rights or enforcing those federal statutes. 
Counterterrorism 
It is those circumstances that authorize the federalization of the National Guard 
and the use of the armed forces under the Insurrection Act of 1807.16 But when we 
examine transnational terrorism in the context of the Insurrection Act, we are not 
really dealing with an insurrection as that act defines it. At a minimum, we need to 
re-examine the archaic terminology of the Insurrection and the Posse Comitatus 
acts in order to ensure that their language remains consistent with the character of 
the threat that we face in the twenty-first century. The Defense Department's posi-
tion has been that the Posse Comitatus Act does not need to be substantively 
amended, but that the terminology of both the Posse Comitatus and the Insurrec-
tion acts should be reconsidered in order to ensure the principles oflaw reflected in 
those statutes remain relevant to the twenty-first-century threat. 
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Can we use the National Guard for domestic counterterrorism missions in 
support of civilian law enforcement? I am not certain the law is clear on that 
point. That too must be examined, probably by legislative authorities. Congress 
about a year ago amended the law to provide that a joint task fo rce OTF) engaged 
in counter-narcotic activities, typically along the borders of the United States, 
could engage in counterterrorism activities domestically in support of civilian 
law enforcement. It was a very brief amendment to the law. With virtually no 
legislative history, we are still trying to figure out the legislative intent reflected 
in that statutory change, but the law now provides that Title 10 active-duty mil-
itary forces , like JTF North in EI Paso, Texas, may engage in counterterrorism 
activity in support of civilian law enfo rcement authorities. There is no analo-
gous provision of law empowering the National Guard to engage in similar mis-
sions. As a result, we now have a disparity in the law in which Title 10 forces may 
take on such counterterrorism missions, but National Guard fo rces may not, 
even though they may be colocated. 
In the absence of other specific legislation, we find ourselves straining, under 
pre-existing authorities not particularly well suited to counterterrorism missions, 
to shoehorn what are at least in appearance and perhaps in substance counter-
terrorism activities into other statutory authority. What r suggest needs to be un-
dertaken, in a sober, serious and deliberative manner, is an effort to better define the 
counterterrorism mission assigned to Title 10 joint task forces and the parallel au-
thori ty, if any, granted to the National Guard to also engage in counterterrorism 
activities in support of civilian law enforcement. 
Intelligence Support 
Another issue that I'm going to be unable to resolve in my remarks, but want to 
pose for your consideration, is intelligence support for domestic uses of the armed 
forces. When military forces are used within our own borders fo r certain 
warfighting, counterterrorism and force protection missions, there is a require-
ment for intelligence, as is the case fo r all military missions. 1 suspect when those 
Marines defended against those unnamed invading forces at Bladensburg in 18 14 
they had military intelligence requirements, such as: Where are the enemy forces? 
By what means are they moving towards our positions? How many are there and 
how are they equipped? In short, the information needed to better anticipate and 
respond to the enemy attack. 
That requirement is as necessary today as it was then. As we look at the domestic 
warfighting responsibilities of both the Title 10 military forces and, under the re-
cent statutory amendment to Title 32, the National Guard, the question arises, 
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how. consistent with the civilian character of our government and the preservation 
of domestic civil liberties. do we acquire the intelligence information necessary to 
support our domestic military missions? There is no easy answer to that question 
and determining the answer will require sober judgment. We in the military see 
ourselves as consumers. not collectors. of domestic intelligence. I believe the law 
sees us as consumers as well. There are provisions of the law. very tightly con-
strained. that do allow certain military units. such as counterterrorism units. mili-
tary intelligence units and general utility forces. to collect intelligence domestically. 
But. for reasons that are obvious and fundamental to the character of our nation. 
the role of the military in collecting domestic intelligence is very tightly and. in my 
judgment. appropriately constrained. 
The military has statutory authority to collect domestic intelligence that relates 
to anti-terrorism fo rce protection. Our terrorist adversaries do see. as indicated 
earlier. the United States as a part of the global battlespace. In the context of the 
past precedent of the September I I attacks and a continuing threat of domestic at-
tack. anti-terrorism force protection requirements for the military have been 
heightened as a military mission as a matter of immediacy. 
The question to be considered is. given the force protection mission of conduct-
ing an active defense against the transnational terrorist threat within our borders 
and given the parameters of existing statutory authority that allow us to collect in-
telligence domestically for such a purpose, how do we bring to that framework an 
appropriate degree of clar ity and detail that both enables the successful intelligence 
support of those military missions. while avoiding an intrusive and improper en-
gagement in domestic intelligence collection activities by military fo rces? It is part 
of the balance that I addressed earlier. It is a balance that is subject to contin uing as-
sessment because of the nature of the threat that we now face domestically and the 
role of the military in defending against that threat. 
Employment of Non-lethal Weapons 
In response to Hurricane Katrina we deployed for either active or contingent 
military missions about fifteen thousand security personnel. Most of those military 
personnel were deployed to the New Orleans area. You may recall that about four 
or five days after Katrina came ashore. the president deployed twenty-two thou-
sand Title to military forces on a humanitarian mission . They were there in con-
formity with the Posse Comitatus Act and also available for service in anticipation 
of invocation of the Insurrection Act if civil disorder had continued within New 
Orleans. The soldiers from the Army's 82nd Airborne and 1st Calvary divisions 
and Marines from the 1st and 2nd Marine divisions deployed to New Orleans for a 
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humanitarian mission. But they also established a military presence and were avail-
able, subject to presidential authority, for security missions if the president had 
chosen to invoke the Insurrection Act. In addition, we used seven thousand Na-
tional Guard forces, which were not subject to the Posse Comitatus Act, in direct 
law enforcement roles, including over four thousand National Guard military po-
lice who actively and lawfully engaged in law enforcement-related activities. 
Fifteen thousand men and women in uniform were deployed in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina into an area of civil disorder, either directly engaged in security 
missions or potentially engaged in such missions. They were neither trained in the 
use of nor equipped with non-lethal weapons. In my judgment that was a mistake 
and we need to learn from that experience. Imagine, if you will, a need to respond 
to a larger catastrophic event, perhaps a terrorist attack involving weapons of mass 
destruction, where loss of life and physical devastation might be far worse than 
what we experienced during the very difficult and tragic days of Hurricane Katrina. 
We could and should anticipate that, in the context of related civil disorder, the 
military may have a role to play and that role might include the use oflethal force. 
But, again in my judgment, we should not limit the range of options available to 
our military commanders. Commanders on the ground should have the flexibility 
to restore civil order, protect constitutional rights and p reserve federal statutory 
authority with a proportionate degree of force which, in their determinations, 
would be sufficient to fulfill mission requirements. The choice should not be pas-
sivity versus lethali ty. We have non-lethal weapons in our inventory that would be 
sufficient in many circumstances to maintain or restore civil order without neces-
sarily threatening the actual loss of life. 
Certainly the legal issues associated with that are profound. If we deploy sol-
diers on our own streets in a catastrophic circumstance refl ecting a character of 
civil disorder and if we do execute such a deployment for the purpose of preserving 
constitutional rights, equal protection of the law for instance, and enforcing other 
statutory authorities, what legal authority should be provided? What liability pro-
visions should be enacted in order to ensure the proper employment of such non-
lethal capabilities? 
I spoke earlier about critical infrastructure protection. If we use military 
forces to protect critical infrastructure such as nuclear power plan ts against po-
tential al-Qaeda attacks, we have non-lethal capabilities those forces can employ 
that are very high tech in character. Some of those capabilities are quite well devel-
oped in terms of technology-microwave beams for instance--and can be used 
without risking the loss of life . Defending domestic critical infrastructure under 
the same circumstances with rifles and machine guns would pose obvious risks to 
the surrounding civilian community. But what are the public policy issues related 
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to use of non-lethal weapon systems? What are the legal issues? What liability ques-
tions are created? What if we were to use interlocking microwave beams to defend a 
nudear power plant as a humane alternative to the use of deadly force. such as 
M 16s and .sO caliber machine guns? 
Non-lethal weapon systems certainly have the potential to effectively defend 
critical infrastructure. Lives. including innocent lives in the surrounding commu-
nities. could be saved through the use of such systems. But it is almost inevitable 
that an innocent person would be struck by a microwave beam. It seems preferable 
to me to be struck by a beam as opposed to a bullet from an M 16. but what are the 
liability issues? What are the public policy questions that need to be examined? As 
with so many of the questions involving the domestic use of military forces. inte-
gration of non-lethal weapons into use-of-force capabilities must be preceded by 
public debate and legislative deliberation. In that way we can develop a legal frame-
work that properly supports the domestic use of non -lethal weapons as a humane 
alternative to lethal force. 
Who's in Charge? 
The H urricane Katrina experience witnessed multiple layers oflocal. state and fed-
eral government authorities (civilian and military) involved in the response with-
out darityofintent and perhaps with some insensitivity to constitutional history. I 
therefore ask the rather straightforward question, "Who's in charge?" I know there 
are individuals in this audience from Israel. In Israel the answer to "who's in 
charge" in responding to a disaster is pretty clear- it's the Israeli Defence Force 
(l OP). When disaster occurs. the on-scene IDF commander is in charge. 
r spent some time with the Home Front Command in Israel and have some fa-
miliarity with the system of government in Israel. It is a system that is not funda-
mentally federal in character. 
Looking back to the historic events of 1787. it is d ear that our founders created a 
more complex web of authori ties that is consciously embedded and carefully inte-
grated into the US Constitution. Ours is a system of checks and balances. which 
sounds pretty good until you have to mount an effective response to a catastrophic 
event. The theory of our Constitution-the wonderful theory of our Constitu-
tion-is that we preserve liberty through competition. We decentralize power 
throughout the federal government. But by federal I also mean the federal charac-
ter of our government. which includes not just the national government but the 
fifty state and thousands and thousands oflocal governments. We defuse power in 
order to have a system of checks and balances. We have a Constitution that created 
three equal branches of government so that no one branch of government would 
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become too powerful and we gave certain powers to the national government and 
reserved the remainder to the states. 
We have provisions in the Constitution, including the Tenth Amendment, 
guaranteeing certain authorities to the states, and others from the states to local 
government. So we recognize-at least I recognize--that if we are to remain con-
sistent with the Constitution, the issue is really not "who's in charge." Under our 
Constitution, we will never have absolute unity of command. Our founders in their 
wisdom didn 't want that . They dispersed power in a decentralized manner 
throughout the various levels and branches of government. So our challenge is not 
to achieve unity of command; our challenge is to achieve, in military terminology, 
unity of effort within that system of decentralized authority, those checks and bal-
ances created by our founders. That requires very dose coordination and detailed, 
integrated planning among all levels of government and between civilian authori-
ties and military forces. 
H.L. Mencken once said that for every complex problem, there is a solution that 
is simple, neat and wrong. There is no simple solution consistent with a Constitu-
tion of checks and balances. It requires hard work, integrated planning, a common 
understanding of the threat environment and careful consideration of foreseeable 
missions in advance of a crisis so that in the context of checks and balances we 
nonetheless achieve a unity of effort. 
Conclusion 
Forgive me fo r going on at such length, but I wanted to give you some sense of both 
the complexity of the issues and the seriousness and purpose that have been 
brought to those issues since September 11, 200 I. We know that the US military 
has a tremendous ability to provide for the physical security of the American peo-
ple, including the contingent missions related to domestic warfighting against for-
eign adversaries on our own soil if civilian law enforcement authorities are not 
capable of meeting the perceived or very real threat. And, as was obvious in Hurri-
cane Katrina, we in the Department of Defense have a very important role to play 
in providing consequence management capabilities to augment and reinforce ci-
vilian authorities. But in the overall context of enhanced core missions evolving for 
the military domestically in the twenty-first century, we have not forgotten the 
cautionary words of Federalist 8. The achievement of security while maintaining 
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